Cyberwar – The FireEye and SolarWinds attack

Cyberwar – The FireEye and SolarWinds attack

Cyberwar – The FireEye and SolarWinds attack.

Should Digital Authoritarianism cause the threshold for war to be redefined?

By Philip Ingram MBE

In early December the US based cyber security giant, FireEye detected a breach in what Kevin Mandia their CEO described as, “a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities.” He went on to say, “The attackers tailored their world-class capabilities specifically to target and attack FireEye. They are highly trained in operational security and executed with discipline and focus. They operated clandestinely, using methods that counter security tools and forensic examination. They used a novel combination of techniques not witnessed by us or our partners in the past.”

The attackers stole a series of what he described as, “certain Red Team assessment tools that we use to test our customers’ security. These tools mimic the behaviour of many cyber threat actors.” In essence they stole FireEye’s own hacking toolkit but given its customer base of high-level corporates and government agencies, the toolkits would be designed to test these networks and systems.

Whilst investigating the attack his team identified that, “the attacker primarily sought information related to certain government customers.”  More worryingly they identified, “a supply chain attack trojanising SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware we call SUNBURST.”

Some reporting has attributed the attack to a Russian state-sponsored group known as APT 29, or Cozy Bear. However, in 2017 a group of hackers known as the Shadow Brokers published a collection of hacking tools, stolen from the NSA. FireEye have not yet named the actor but speculation it was Russian is rife. A Kremlin official denied that Russia had any involvement.

SolarWinds is a company that provides IT infrastructure management software, ensuring software updates are downloaded and installed automatically and the like.  Many of its customers are large enterprises or government agencies controlling things like critical national infrastructure, power and water grids, nuclear facilities, military facilities and more.

SolarWinds estimated some 18,000 customers had downloaded the trojanised updates enabling the attacker to possibly monitor network activity and possibly steal data and credentials from the infected systems. It could potentially allow the attacker to take control of networks.  The full degree of exploitation hasn’t been made public yet.

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released an alert detailing what it knows about the breach. “Beginning in March 2020, hackers used SolarWinds software updates to install a secret network backdoor, which authorities are calling SUNBURST,” they said, adding, “Once installed on a network, the malware used a protocol designed to mimic legitimate SolarWinds traffic to communicate with a domain that would often direct the malware to a new internet protocol (IP) address for command and control. The attackers used rotating IPs and virtual private servers with IP addresses in the target’s home country to make detection of the traffic more difficult

The CISA concluded, “taken together, these observed techniques indicate an adversary who is skilled, stealthy with operational security, and is willing to expend significant resources to maintain covert presence.”

In the UK, SolarWinds clients include the NHS, the Ministry of Defence, Cabinet Office, Ministry of Justice, GCHQ, the Civil Aviation Authority and various police forces. It’s not clear if any of these bodies used the Orion update or if they have been affected. The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) said, “The NCSC is working closely with FireEye and international partners on this incident.  Investigations are ongoing, and we are working extensively with partners and stakeholders to assess any U.K. impact.”

Microsoft has also been affected and identified 40 clients that had been exposed, including some in the UK.  Paul Chichester, NCSC Director of Operations, said:  “This is a complex, global cyber incident, and we are working with international partners to fully understand its scale and any UK impact. That work is ongoing and will take some time, but simply having SolarWinds does not automatically make an organisation vulnerable to real world impact.”

In a recent speech by the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, at Policy Exchange earlier this year, when talking about attack from authoritarian rivals and extremist ideologies, he said, “Their strategy of ‘political warfare’ is designed to undermine cohesion, to erode economic, political and social resilience, and to compete for strategic advantage in key regions of the world. Their goal is to win without going to war: to achieve their objectives by breaking our willpower, using attacks below the threshold that would prompt a war-fighting response.”

He was describing what he went on to call ‘Digital Authoritarianism’ and said “None of our rivals can afford to go to war as we define it. They want to win below that threshold. However, the stakes are high.”

However, what has never really been defined from a defence perspective is where that ‘threshold’ lies? If the attack had been physical in nature against critical national infrastructure either by a physical team taking control or explosives destroying its operability, then that would likely have crossed that line.

How do you respond to ‘Digital Authoritarianism’ where that authoritarianism has led to data, possibly classified, designs, processes, codes, being stolen? How do you respond where that authoritarianism has allowed a foreign state to have control of nationally critical capabilities to the same extent as if they had people in the control room? How do you respond when physical infrastructure has been destroyed because of manipulated code?

Given that war hasn’t been formally declared since 1939 yet British and allied troops have been in an almost perpetual states of conflict since then end of the Second World War, does that mean that the very underpinning definitions of warfare that General Carter alluded to need to be redefined before we can properly examine our defence and security needs?

What is clear is this latest attack is yet another wakeup call to national cyber vulnerabilities. How many more are needed before we see a greater response? If nation states can’t protect their infrastructure from attacks by other nation states, surely that is a fundamental failure in government?

Cyber, I am sure we will see, will feature heavily in the upcoming integrated Defence and Security review, and rightly so.

 

 

 

 

 

Leadership is about doing, not saying.

Leadership is about doing, not saying.

Leadership is about doing, not saying. It is time with regard to Mental Health training and awareness, for senior leaders to ‘walk the walk and not just talk the talk.’

There was a slight nervousness in the faces of General Sir Nick Carter, Admiral Tony Radakin, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith and Air Chief Marshall Sir Mike Wigston, collectively known in defence as ‘The Chiefs’ in a video they released collectively to mark World Mental Health day on Saturday 10th October.

“During these important times it’s more important than ever that we take notice of our mental wellbeing and that of our colleagues, our friends and our family and particularly those we lead,” said Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, opening the video.

“Since the publication of the Armed Forces Mental Health Strategy 2011, the mental health and wellbeing of our Defence People has been a subject of substantial investment and focus. The next five years will see a period of sustained focus on mental health and wellbeing. We need to engage everyone in Defence, at all levels, if we are to maintain a mentally healthy population,” said Lieutenant General Richard Nugee, then Chief of Defence People, in his foreword to The Defence People Mental Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2017-2022.

So, do the senior leaders in Defence lead by example when it comes to Mental Health, we are 3 years into the 5 year strategy building on the 2011 foundation?  This is a very difficult question to get a tangible answer to as, despite their underlying nervousness, ‘The Chiefs’ were advancing a more positive mental health message in their video, which is good. They were talking the talk.

Not being satisfied with the substance behind some of the MoDs ‘talk’ a little digging was done.  That digging found out that, “The MoD does not mandate any formal recorded Mental Health training for Senior Officers.”

That is fine in itself as the Armed Forces Mental Health Strategy was published in 2011 giving a long time to get training in place and develop a culture of it being “must do” for leaders, as that is setting an example. After all the Australian Navy says, “Leaders acknowledge the moral equality of all who serve and build a climate of mutual respect.” That is simply leading by example and the training exists in various guises.

In addition, our senior leaders have a command function and that is a legal function, requiring set, auditable standards to ensure consistency and fairness in their judgements. They, in various guises, are the ultimate arbiters with complaints, they set the moral policy across defence and rule on areas where they feel it has been broken. You can’t do that on ad hoc knowledge.

So, what is the reality of how the senior leadership of all three services approach the example they set to mental health awareness and training. It is recognised there is a lot of mental health awareness briefing going on across defence, but given ‘Command’ has a legal status, ad hoc briefing isn’t good enough.

According to ‘The Chiefs’ and the Armed Forces Mental Health Strategy, mental health is engaging everyone and is getting substantial investment; therefore, formal training is critical to ensure the foundation for that legal status Command empowers so that it is consistent and auditable.

Armed with positivity from the Chiefs talking the talk, the MoD was asked about formal mental health training in the senior officer cohort, so RN Captain, Army Colonel and RAF Group Captain (OF5) and above. These ranks and above are those in the most senior command positions, those that should set examples to their subordinates across defence.

The statistics speak for themselves, OF 5 is Captain (RN), Colonel, Group Captain and they go up from there so in Army parlance, OF 6 is Brigadier, OF 7 Major General and on:

Rank  Number of Officers            Number MH Trained          Percentage

RN (including RM)

OF9                2                                  0                                              0%

OP8                7                                  0                                              0%

OF7                32                                4                                              12.5%

OF6                85                                9                                              10.6%

OF5                297                             2                                              0.67%

Total:             423                             15                                            3.55%

Army

OF9                4                                  0                                              0%

OP8                16                                2                                              12.5%

OF7                42                                3                                              7.1%

OF6    Brig     147                             14                                            9.5%

OF5    Col      517                             3                                              0.58%

Total:             726                             22                                            3.03%

RAF

OF9                3                                  0                                              0%

OP8                6                                  0                                              0%

OF7                28                                0                                              0%

OF6                83                                4                                              4.82%

OF5                286                             1                                              0.35%

Total:              406                             5                                              1.23%

What makes the statistics worse if that could be possible, is that none of ‘The Chiefs,’ the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet, Chief of the General Staff or Chief of the Air Staff have completed any recorded training course and only seven 2 star (OF7) officers in ‘Command Positions’ across defence have done so, none in the RAF. Is this leadership by example?  It is clear that our senior leaders in uniform and worse, those in command positions, do not walk the walk.

Karen McLeish whose teenage son Alistair was found hanged in a bathroom at Catterick Garrison, North Yorkshire, told Mark Nicol of the Mail on Sunday, ‘This is a shocking disclosure. The MoD constantly says it is committed to soldiers’ mental health. Yet how can they be when so few officers are trained in this area and when the course is voluntary? This is the wrong attitude; the MoD must properly accept its responsibilities otherwise troops will continue to suffer in silence until it is too late to help them.’

Tobias Ellwood, chair of the Commons Defence Select Committee said to mark Nicol of the MoD figures: ‘It is sad to see an important initiative, not being welcomed by the officer class. Their absence and non-participation is concerning given the genuine efforts the imbalance in support for mental versus physical health.’

In essence, actions speak louder than words, is what the first African American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, said of leaders when he uttered the words, “The most important thing I learned is that soldiers watch what their leaders do. You can give them classes and lecture them forever, but it is your personal example they will follow.”  Is this leadership by example?

The gauntlet has been thrown down, how many more lives must be destroyed or lost before the senior officer cohort in Defence stop talking the talk and actually walk the walk? When will command recognise the need for moral leadership, leadership by example? When will defence recognise the need for consistent auditable activity in its people sphere?

I personally had a senior officer record in interview notes after interviewing me, “I wish to formally record my concern for the welfare and wellbeing of this officer,” and he then did nothing but watch my life fall apart over the next few years. He took great delight in highlighting to his bosses that he showed concern by noting his concerns, he talked the talk, but his inaction in looking after me or even talking to me and telling me of those concerns, demonstrated he didn’t walk the walk. Defence tried every trick in the book to stop me getting a copy of his interview notes, they failed, so, yes, it is personal!

If the Chiefs say, “People are our most important asset,” yet this is the example they set, how can they be trusted with less important issues such as equipment capabilities as are being debated as part of the Integrated Defence and Security Review. Where does the responsibility ‘buck’ stop?

{All answers were provided by the MoD under a FOIA request that asked about any and all formal MH training. The MoD provided all of the answers and were approached by the MoS for comment, providing only a holding reply, they won’t talk to Philip Ingram as he is on Defences naughty step.}

 

Philip Ingram MBE is a PTSD survivor no thanks to the MoD; he is available for comment please just visit the Contact Us page for details.

 

 

 

 

Toxic by Dan Kaszeta – a review

Toxic by Dan Kaszeta – a review

Toxic by Dan Kaszeta – a review

(A History of Nerve Agents, From Nazi Germany to Putin’s Russia)

By Philip Ingram MBE

I have the unenviable label attached to my profile as a CBRNE expert partly through modules on my Applied Science degree from The Royal Military College of Science being nicknamed the ‘Chemistry of Death,” partially because one of my Masters degree projects was in emerging CBRN threats and partly through my military service having had to deal with CBRNE threats both theoretical and actual all during my 26 years in Service.

I therefore looked forward to the book “Toxic” by Dan Kaszeta, delving into the history of nerve agents from Nazi Germany to Putin’s Russia. Of course, I was considered an expert, I had made organophosphate compounds in a lab, I knew the Germans had invented nerve agents on the back of pesticide research and that the British had invented Vx and Novick’s were Russian; so, what would I learn?

All I can say is a hell of a lot!  Toxic is a comprehensive, exceptionally well researched and thorough explanation of nerve agents, where they came from, how, in broad terms they are made, stored, weaponised, used and work. Having sat in a laboratory being lectured about nerve agents, they can be a very dry subject to say the least, but Dan Kaszeta has managed another coup, to tell their history in a way that reads like a spy thriller. Toxic is a page turner!

That page turner is enhanced by Dan’s very real credibility having been a US Army Chemical Officer and, in the US Secret Service, protecting POTUS from CBRN threats. His knowledge, practical experience and ability to put things in real context shines through.

The title of the opening chapter gave away that the book was well written ‘Axis of Weevils’ brought together the German connection with pesticides, a summary of the whole chapter in 3 words, brilliant.  Importantly he describes how it was the German Army and not the SS who controlled the militarisation of the pesticide research discoveries, a clear example of the real tensions there were between different elements of the German war machine.

The other two important point that came out from his analysis of the German development of nerve agents were the complexity manufacturing them and how this was greatly magnified when attempting industrial level production and secondly the importance of the stocks, documents and scientists captured by the allies at the end of the war.

The complexity issue is critical and reinforced at every turn as the history weaves its way thought the 1950’s and the UK discovering Vx and the 60,70and 80’s with the challenges of not just manufacture but storage and of course delivery means. It is critical when examining the flippant way many so called scientists suggested they could easily make Novichok in a laboratory as part of their defence of Russia post the Skripal affair.

I have one comment to them – I dare you – I know none would even consider it and I shudder at my own fume cupboard concoctions (to be clear none were nerve agents or close).

The unpredictable nature of nerve agents as a weapon and their lack of real impact on the battlefield was well explained as he described their use in the Middle East by Iraq.  Such is their political psychological impact we mustn’t forget it was partially nerve agents that led to the second Iraq war and all of the consequences being still suffered today.  Dan highlights with clear examples why nerve agents are not good weapons of war and not as effective as their deadly reputation suggests.

Given that, I was hoping he might have uncovered more detail around a little reported Operation Avarice where the CIA bought chemical weapons in Iraq in 2005 and 2006.  The few press stories about it are misleading, inaccurate and only tell skewed parts of the story, however I suspect the real files relating to Avarice won’t be released for many years, if ever! One for the next edition.

Having clearly explained how difficult nerve agents are as a weapon of war he explains their effectiveness as weapons of assassination, carefully targeted as in the Vx attack on Kim Jong Nam and the Novichok attack on Sergei Skripal. It is refreshing to read sound accurate analysis, logically explained and completely myth busting.

In all, if you have an interest in military weapon systems, chemical warfare, the impact of personality on decision making and intelligence gathering, the intrigues of manufacturing, storing and weaponising nerve agents (without too much detail) then this is the book for you.  If you like espionage, intriguing factual accounts of real events and a really good read, then this is the book for you.  I highly recommend it.

You can order the book here: https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/toxic/

 

The Salisbury Poisonings – an informed opinion

The Salisbury Poisonings – an informed opinion

The Salisbury Poisonings – an informed opinion

The BBC Drama that has had over 7 million viewers, The Salisbury Poisonings, was a emotional look back at yet another unprecedented incident, the first use of the deadly nerve agent Novichok anywhere in the world, never mind on the streets of Salisbury, a sleepy hollow nicknamed ‘Smallsbury’ because of its village feel but made famous through its now infamous 142 m spire.

A difficult story to tell in a drama because there were and are so many moving components. We have to remember the incident is still subject to an active murder investigation after the death of Dawn Sturgess, having sprayed herself with what she and her boyfriend Charlie Rowley thought was perfume. In reality it was Novichok from a container discarded by the pair of would be assassins, Colonel Dr Alexander Mishkin and Colonel Anatoliy Chepiga of the GRU, the Russian Military Intelligence.

The drama focused on the human stories behind The Director of Wiltshire’s Public Health, Tracy Daszkiewicz, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, one of the early responders, and Dawn Sturgess, rather than the incident, the actual response, the investigation and the unresolved issues.  It was a powerful piece of television especially considering the potential impact on many of these involved who are still coming to terms with what was a life changing event.

A clearly deliberate move gave the series a direction that people not familiar with the story could relate to and in a very emotionally charged way, it highlighted many of the stresses and strains of the time. It gave a personality to Dawn Sturgess, who in press reporting at the time had her as a person clouded by many of the daemons she was battling but never gave her that personality.  It also showed the stress on the Bailey family and the impact of having their lives turned upside down. It tried to highlight the complexity Tracy Daszkiewicz had to face when coordinating a large multi-agency response but missed elements of that to concentrate on her personal journey.

For the informed as with any drama there will be frustrations, I am sure A&E consultants and staff cringe at Casualty when it is on, but still find it entertaining, so these observations are meant in that vein.  I don’t think the initial paramedic and A&E response was portrayed as well as it could and the scenes in the hospital at times were a little wooden, as was the portrayal of Porton Down; but these were not central to the plot, the people were.

I was frustrated at the lack of trying to further interpret many of the unanswered questions, but that frustration is tempered by the fact is it still an ongoing and active murder investigation, so that speculation couldn’t have happened in any detail and wouldn’t have added to the people element of the story.

Some of the questions to my mind that remain unanswered include;

Why the public were not warned about a clear and present danger remaining, I had reported the probability to CT Police, written a detailed blog about it and had a story about it published in the Sunday Papers on 15thMarch as well as having commented on it on many radio and TV interviews?

What evidence is there of a second team that will have carried out a pattern of life study against Sergei Skripal in the days prior to the attack? How were he and his daughter Yulia monitored by Russian Intelligence and does Salisbury have a permanent interest from Russian Military Intelligence?

What were the full movements of Mishkin and Chepiga on the weekend of the attack? Where else did they go in Salisbury, who else did they meet? Why have we not seen more of the CCTV?

What happened to the gloves and other potential PPE Mishkin and Chepiga will have worn as they deployed the Novichok on Sergei Skripal’s front door? Why has that never been found and what is the real story surrounding the perfume bottle found by Charlie Rowley? Why has there not been a definitive statement about any potential remaining threat?

In all a very good series and well put together.  However, I have to ask if it was too soon after the incident? Only Tracy, Nick and Dawns family can answer that. I feel it has reopened many of the questions I have highlighted above and think there should be a more documentary style look back at the whole, unprecedented event soon. I would go further and ask more about the Russian influence in the UK, their intelligence operations and if they have a particular continual interest in Salisbury and its surrounds?

 

A link to my collated blogs from the time is here: https://greyharemedia.com/the-skripal-affair-a-history-in-blogs/   – if you would like any further comment from Philip, please contact him by clicking HERE

The Skripal affair – a history in blogs

The Skripal affair – a history in blogs

The Skripal affair – a history in blogs and the unanswered questions

By Philip Ingram MBE

This post is a library giving introductions and links to the 15 blogs I wrote relating to the Skripal attack.

There remains a number of unanswered questions which we are unlikely to get detail on as this remains an active investigation by Counter Terror Police (CTP) UK.  They have released enough information to get formal charges and an INTERPOL Red notice issued against the believed perpetrators, Colonel Dr Alexander Mishkin and Colonel Anatoliy Chepiga of the GRU, the Russian Military Intelligence.  CTP UK don’t need to release any other information at this stage

The bigger questions that remain unanswered include:

What evidence is there of a second team that will have carried out a pattern of life study against Sergei Skripal in the days prior to the attack? How were he and his daughter Yulia monitored by Russian Intelligence and does Salisbury have a permanent interest from Russian Military Intelligence?

What were the full movements of Mishkin and Chepiga on the weekend of the attack? Where else did they go in Salisbury, who else did they meet? Why have we not seen more of the CCTV?

What happened to the gloves and other potential PPE Mishkin and Chepiga will have worn as they deployed the Novichok on Sergei Skripal’s front door? What has that never been found and what is the real story surrounding the perfume bottle found by Charlie Rowley? Why was the potential clear and present danger not highlighted at the time?

Blog links are in chronological order:

07/08 March 2018

Sergei Skripal – was it an assassination?

‪As someone who commanded an intelligence unit with a capability for the covert surveillance of Russian intelligence operations, I think I am qualified to do some analysis of detail that is coming out from the reporting of the Sergei Skripal incident.

https://greyharemedia.com/sergei-skripal-assassination/

11 March 2018

Sergei and Yulia Skripal – additional assessment

The reporting around how Sergei and Yulia Skripal were poisoned and how Det Sgt Nick Bailey came to get sufficient exposure to make him very seriously ill with another 20 or 21 casualties have to be treated for potential contamination raises a number of questions. The reason is, classic nerve agents, even thickened ones are not designed to be slow acting, they are designed to incapacitate first and foremost overwhelming evacuation and medical facilities, sending a clear psychological message to anyone operating in the area where chemical weapons are used.

https://greyharemedia.com/sergei-and-yulia-skripal-assassination-attempt-further-comment/

13 March 2018

Новичок – Novichok what do we know and what do we not know?

Prime Minister Teresa May confirming the agent used in the assassination attempt on Sergei and Yulia Skripal, that put Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey in intensive care and contaminated a number of other people as Novichok, has clarified some of what the country speculated and raised a whole new set of questions; not least of which is what is Novichock? What do we know about it and more importantly what do we not know about it?

https://greyharemedia.com/novichok-what-do-we-know/ 

14 March 2018

Novichock, what response would be appropriate for Russia?

With the Russians having failed to respond to Prime Minister Teresa Mays deadline to answer the simple question of “how this nerve agent came to be used” relating to the use of military grade Novichock in an attack on Sergei and Yulia Skripal that put Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey in intensive care on Sunday 8th March in Salisbury.  How should she respond, what are her options, can she really punish Putin and Russia?

https://greyharemedia.com/what-response-would-be-appropriate-for-russia/

15 March 2018

 Is there a continuing clear and present danger?

As support from around the world grows for Prime Minister Teresa Mays stance on what she refers to as the “unlawful use of force” by the Russians on UK soil, with the poisoning of the former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, his daughter Yulia and Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey on the streets of Salisbury using a “military grade nerve agent” Novichok, questions remain.

https://greyharemedia.com/clear-and-present-danger/

26 March 2018

Salisbury, sleepy hollow or spooks playground?

The assassination attempts on Sergei and Yulia Skripal on 4th March has left the world reeling in horror at the first use of a nerve agent in Europe, never mind one Teresa May described as a ‘military grade Novichok’ agent when she firmly pointed the UK finger at Russia. But is there more to Salisbury than meets the eye? Is it a Russian spooks playground?

https://greyharemedia.com/salisbury-sleepy-hollow-or-spooks-playground/

28 March 2018

Skripal poisoning, it was on the door

When Teresa May said in Parliament, “It is now clear that Mr Skripal and his daughter were poisoned with a military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by Russia. This is part of a group of nerve agents known as ‘Novichok’.”  Fingers were pointed at Russia as they have a history of using novel methods to assassinate people, Alexander Litvinenko is a case in point, it sends a message.

https://greyharemedia.com/skripal-poisoning-it-was-on-the-door/

11 April 2018

Novichok and Salisbury – a British Military failure

It should have been a strategic gift, an assassination attempt using an agent that as we have heard from Gary Aitkenhead, the chief executive of the MoD, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), said was a military-grade novichok nerve agent, which could probably be deployed only by a nation-state. Instead, we are being led a merry dance in information terms regarding the burden of proof and apportionment of blame.

https://greyharemedia.com/a-british-military-failure/

07 July 2018

Salisbury and Novichok the truth and myth

As someone who commanded an intelligence unit with a capability for the covert surveillance of Russian intelligence operations, has studied organic chemistry related to defence against chemical and biological weapons at both degree and master’s degree level, I think I am qualified to do some analysis of detail that is coming out from the reporting of the Sergei and Yulia Skripal and subsequent incidents in Salisbury.

https://greyharemedia.com/salisbury-and-novichok-the-truth-and-myth/

09 July 2018

 How did Dawn and Charlie get contaminated?

I have been talking to a number of press outlets regarding how the detritus from the Skripal attack could have come to be in a position to contaminate and kill Dawn Sturgess and put her partner Charlie Rowley into intensive care in Salisbury District Hospital.

https://greyharemedia.com/how-did-dawn-and-charlie-get-contaminated-in-salisbury/

15 September 2018

GRU and Salisbury, a more complete account.

It is not every day that a quiet little English city is caught in the grips of a story that would be a page-turner in any spy novel, where the readers would be sceptical that what was being written about could actually happen.  Well, it did, with the tragic death of Dawn Sturgess and the hospitalisation of Charlie Rowley, Nick Bailey, Yulia Skripal and her father, the intended target of a nerve agent attack, former Russian GRU Colonel, Sergei Skripal.

https://greyharemedia.com/gru-and-salisbury-a-more-complete-account/

04 October 2018

The GRU is on the Ropes

At one-minute past midnight on 4thOctober 2018 a statement came out from the British Government saying that the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) had “identified that a number of cyber actors widely known to have been conducting cyber-attacks around the world are, in fact, the GRU.”

https://greyharemedia.com/the-gru-is-on-the-ropes/

07 November 2018

The Skripal Files by Mark Urban, a review by Philip Ingram MBE

https://greyharemedia.com/the-skripal-files/

02 March 2019

Skripal and Salisbury an infamous combination

It is now a year since Colonel Dr Alexander Mishkin and Colonel Anatoliy Chepiga, traveling under the false identities of Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, both members of the Russian Military Intelligence Service, the GRU, entered Britain through Gatwick airport. They had a deadly intent, kill the double agent who was living in the sleepy city of Salisbury, Sergei Skripal, using the deadly nerve agent Novichok.

https://greyharemedia.com/skripal-and-salisbury-an-infamous-combination-one-year-on/

20 May 2019

The Skripal Investigation, the next revelation.

The Skripal Investigation, the next revelation.

On Saturday The Guardian Newspaper published a story which said: “The Russian men suspected of poisoning Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury received a phone call after returning to London on the day of the alleged attack, raising the possibility that a backup team played a role in the operation.

https://greyharemedia.com/skripal-the-next-revelation/

Note: These blogs were written by Philip Ingram MBE, a former British Army Intelligence Officer and Chemical Weapons Expert who was based near Salisbury in the past. If you would like any further comment from Philip, please contact him by clicking HERE