Day 1000 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day Special Military Operation

Day 1000 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day Special Military Operation

Day 1000 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day Special Military Operation

by Philip INGRAM MBE

Russia has the tactical initiative, but only just, at the operational level and strategically the conflict is in a stalemate position, but Ukraine is holding the initiative by its fingertips.  The 1000 days has cost almost 750,000 Russian casualties according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, and whilst there are no official figures, Ukraine has probably suffered in the region of 500,000 casualties.

This 10-day Special Military Operation Putin had planned, has backfired on him in so many ways. It is only his ability to adapt, international support from Iran, North Korea, China and the likes of India and Pakistan that are keeping him going alongside his tactical meatgrinder tactics. Human life is cheap to Putin, especially when it’s not Muscovites who are being sent for slaughter.

The doom merchants are calling it a Ukrainian failure and anticipating the new Trump Presidency bringing an end to the conflict by imposing a settlement, in order to “stop wasting US Taxpayers Dollars.”  This is discussed in more detail below, but the headline is that this would potentially stimulate a global conflict.

Biden has finally authorised the use of US long range missiles into Russian territory, and it is likely UK and French permission for Strom Shadow/SCALP will follow. This has happened now because of North Koreas direct involvement with troops on the front line, Russia failing to heed Trumps call for no escalation by attacking Ukrainian power infrastructure with hundreds of drones and missiles and possible pressure from Trumps team, so the decision was made by Biden leaving Trump more negotiating room. Putin’s response, predictable threats of escalation but no real action.

These missiles with impact Russia’s ability to concentrate capability withing 150+ miles of the Ukrainian border/frontline and this will have a significant effect on Russia’s ability to support its tactical operations.

Tactically Russia has regained part of the initiative in the East with a steady but slow and costly capture of further territory. Ukraine, with its ambitious excursion into the Russian Kursk province had regained that initiative, hoped it would draw troops away from the East, but that hasn’t happened and Russia’s relentless meatgrinder tactics have kept Ukrainian defences under constant pressure. The cost to Russia is now that Putin is relying on North Korean troops and recruiting in Africa to feed his meatgrinder. This is unsustainable.

However, this is far from a tactical war and conflicts are often won at the operational or strategic level, no matter how tactical battles go. We should remember the US won every tactical engagement in Vietnam but lost the conflict. The same with NATO and allied forces in Afghanistan.

If we look at what has happened to date from strategic and operational perspective:

Strategic Objective: Putin re-invaded Ukraine on 23rd February 2022 to try and topple the Zelensky government, put a puppet regime in place and reduce the potential for NATO expansion.

Outcome: The Ukrainians pushed Russia from Kyiv, forced their withdrawal to the eastern part of Ukraine, re captures thousands of square kilometres of land, destroyed thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and hundreds of thousands of Russian service personnel, stopped Russia gaining Air Superiority and sunk almost a third of the Black Sea Fleet. NATO has expanded welcoming Finland with a land border with Russia and welcoming Sweden. The Wests Defence industrial base has been shocked into expanding production capability to meet war needs. Russia’s defence industrial base is suffering such that supplies from North Korea and Iran are essential to the Russian war effort.

Result: Russia has refocused its main effort to the East and set new success criteria as holding onto the land it has captured to date by forcing Western ‘Ukraine fatigue.’ This is enhanced by Western focus shift to the Middle East.

Strategic Objective: Dislocation of Western and wider global support for Ukraine, collapse of NATO, further division within the EU and greater US isolationism.

Outcome: NATO has come together politically and militarily better than it has been before. It has recognised many of its shortfalls and in particular relationship with its defence industrial bases. Not only is it growing but it is slowly regenerating a better conventional capability. However, the EU is becoming increasingly politically polarised, and elements of UK politics crave greater isolationism, and we are seeing a growth of right-wing politics. The UK has lost its influence and ability to bridge between EU and US politics. US support for Ukraine is being debated because of Trumps historical comments but $60 Bn of US money invested in the US Defence industrial base is a lot of jobs and is good for the US economy. It is highly unlikely that Trump will want to undo this industrial capacity and start to cut his defence industrial base back, so production will continue to increase.

Result: Putin sees political weakness as the way of increasing ‘Ukraine Fatigue’ and gaining his objective of a settlement at current boundaries. He will increase destabilising activities across Europe, (the German Government has all but collapsed), he will continue to aid further destabilisation in the Middle East and Africa in order to create further political dilemmas and refocus attention away from Ukraine.

Operational Objective: Putin’s Operational Objective is securing the territory he has gained, increasingly try and integrate captured regions including Crimea into Russia, influence Ukrainian exports through the Black Sea. He will try and do what he can to reinforce ‘Ukraine Fatigue’ as he sees this as his only path for a clear victory.

Outcome: Ukraine retains the operational initiative with Special Operations Executive (SOE) type operations happening across all of the occupied territories and into Russia itself. Trains are being derailed, factories catching fire, oil refineries being attacked by drones and of course huge success in sinking almost 1/3 of the Russian Black Sea fleet. In addition, Ukraine remains in the Kursk region of Russia, still holding Russian territory.

Result: Russia if having real difficulty defending against Ukrainian Operational level activities and until Ukrainian tactical supplies reach the levels needed to regain the tactical initiative, this is where the Ukrainian Armed Forces will continue to operate and have significant success. These operations are being headed by General Budanov who leads the GUR, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence. They are designed to and are having success in hollowing out Russia’s ability to sustain its tactical operations whilst influencing Russia strategic decision making.

Trump, Putin and Zelinsky

What is clear is President Trump will try and push Putin and Zelinsky to deliver peace plans, they are both making noises about negotiating, but that is probably to placate Trumps team. Zelinsky if he has sense, (which he has in bucket loads), will talk of concessions and compromises. Putin will talk of retaining what he has and push for more and is unlikely to give concessions. Should this happen, I can see the conditions for Trump to have to send Putin a very clear message via the Ukrainians. Trumps presidency may be very good for Ukraine.

From a wider strategic perspective, with three conflict flashpoints around the world in Europe, in the Middle East and in SE Asis with Taiwan at the focal point, Tump will want Europe to step up and take more of a lead in supporting Ukraine so the US can concentrate more on the Middle East and SE Asia. This is only fair and they is where we will see US diplomatic pressures being applied.

A forced Settlement

Matthew Bunn wrote in a paper for the Harvard Kennedy School titled, “Budapest Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future,” in March 2020. “On December 5, 1994, leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation met in Budapest, Hungary, to pledge security assurances to Ukraine in connection with its accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state. The signature of the so-called Budapest Memorandum concluded arduous negotiations that resulted in Ukraine’s agreement to relinquish the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, which the country inherited from the collapsed Soviet Union, and transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The signatories of the memorandum pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, and to refrain from the use or threat of military force.”

We then get into the Minsk agreements named after the capital of Belarus and were signed there in 2014 and 2015. They were an attempt to secure a ceasefire between the Ukrainian government and Russia-backed separatists in the east of Ukraine. They set out a roadmap for elections in the occupied regions on Luhansk and Donetsk and a plan to reintegrate the territory back into the rest of Ukraine.  However, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognised the independence of the self-proclaimed republics in the run up to his re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Putin does not have a good history in keeping to international agreements he has signed, and the West has an equally poor record in holding Russia to those agreements. It is those two points that would set any peace negotiation with Russia where Ukrainian territory was ceded to Russia that may, in the short term, temporarily end a very bloody conflict but would likely lead to a global conflict within a few short years.  This must be considered when negotiating with Putin.

World War 3

What could the signing of a peace deal with Putin result in? The answer is simple, the impact is potentially catastrophic. Initially it would probably bring an end to the bloodshed in Ukraine but both sides would feel unfulfilled. Rebuilding could start but the impact of what has happened would be felt for generations. The Zelensky government would fail, and any successor would have eyes on rebuilding Ukraine but the potential for corruption to come back and grow bigger would be huge given the effort Putin would put into influencing any new government and the money involved. The west would likely rein back and any Ukrainian accession plan to the EU or move towards joining NATO would be delayed and delays would keep creeping in.

Putin would keep his defence industrial base on its current footing but would be able to capitalise on the relationships he has been developing with Iran, China and North Korea, alongside the lessons he will have learned from the battles in Ukraine, the Russians are very adaptable, and it is highly likely that they would capitalise on better Sino-Russian defence cooperation to capitalise on operational lessons learned, rebuild a more modern and capable Russian military whilst enhancing the Chinese PLA and increase influence, pushing to domination in the Middle East. The quid pro quo for China would be increased Russian support for Chinese dominance in SE Asia. We will see an emboldened of the Axis of Evil of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea growing stronger.

Tensions in the South China Seas have been growing for some time. In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favour of the Philippines and invalidated China’s claim in the strategic waters, Beijing refused to accept the ruling. Those disputed waters are in what China refers to as the nine-dash line, which overlaps the exclusive economic zones of rival claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

The nine-dash line, (also referred to as the eleven-dash line by Taiwan), is a set of line segments on various maps that accompanied competing claims of rights of control and include the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Scarborough Shoal. Certain places have undergone land reclamation by the PRC, ROC, and Vietnam.

This is in addition to the growing tensions between China and Taiwan.  Taiwan has been governed independently of China since 1949, but Beijing views the island as part of its territory as part of its one China Principal and recognition of this through a one China Policy has been the bedrock of Sino-US relations. However, Beijing has vowed to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the mainland, using force if necessary and tensions have increased dramatically as US and other global leaders increasingly talk of Taiwan outside Chinas language of it one China Principal.

Tensions are rising. The Democratic Progressive Party, whose platform favours independence, won a third consecutive term in 2024, while Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei.  Xi Jing Ping of China will be weighing up the potential impact of a reaction from the international community should he decide to take Taiwan by force. If he sees the West capitulate to Putin over Ukraine, he could easily decide that China, with its economic power, could ride out the impact of Western displeasure, especially if it saw an opportunity to further impact western economies and create opportunities for China, or a China, Russia or a China Russia Iranian Pact, possibly underpinned by the BRICS group of countries.  China is already stockpiling natural resources, food and other materials.

Bloomberg’s description of BRICS is, “The BRICS group of emerging-market nations — the acronym stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — has gone from a slogan dreamed up at an investment bank two decades ago to a real-world club that controls a multilateral lender. It doubled in size in 2024, pairing several major energy producers with some of the biggest consumers among developing countries and potentially enhancing the group’s economic clout in a US-dominated world.”

Of course, in the region we have tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It is widely reported and has been consistently reported for almost two years that rising tension on the Korean peninsula is eroding the safeguards set up by both countries against the risk of confrontation. There are regular incidents in the de-militarised zone and with North Korea’s sabre rattling. Increased cooperation with Russia will give the Kim Jong Un regime a boost economically and psychologically and will likely embolden Kim Jong Un which is never good for an unpredictable dictator with nuclear weapons. He could use any sign of weakness in the West as an opportunity.

SE Asian tensions don’t stop here. Russia and Japan have been at loggerheads since the end of the Second World War when the Soviet Union occupied four islands off the northeast coast of Hokkaido, Japan’s second-largest island, the Kuril Islands. Japan claimed that the Soviet Union incorporated them “without any legal grounds” and refused to sign a peace treaty. The Russians view the Kuril Islands as reward for the sacrifices of the Soviet people during the war.  Japan over recent years has changed its constitution from purely defensive to allow offensive operations to protect its territories and has been changing its military to include offensive capabilities.  Defences on the disputed Kuril Islands have been reduced to send military capability to Ukraine. Japan may decide the time has come to take them back.

Should tensions rise to conflict in SE Asia, that that conflict could easily be stimulated by the international community being seen to give in to Putin, then Putin would see any focus to that region by the international community as an opportunity to restart his ambitions to capture the whole of Ukraine and turn it into a Belarus like puppet state, as well as other surrounding states, no matter what peace deals had been signed. Of course, both China and Russia have their relationship with Iran to ensure Middle East tensions remain high. The potential for conflicts in the three separate regions is high and growing and the potential for them to join to a globally impactful conflict is growing also.

So, those who are calling for Ukraine to cede land to Putin in exchange for peace need to understand exactly what the implications are and how that could be a trigger for other conflicts to start.  To have any hope of deterring this we would need to be ready for a conflict on a scale that could be bigger than the Second World War and that means defence expenditure at levels countries haven’t begun to imagine yet.

The thousandth day is a landmark of horror underpinning the continuation of war in Europe. The potential for this to become a global conflict has never been clearer. However, Russia is hurting. Without manpower from North Korea and Africa, and ammunition and equipment from North Korea, Iran and some from China it would be in a much worse position than it is today.  The conflict will end in negotiation, but only when the circumstances are right, and this is some way off yet. The stakes are too high to force the positions when the circumstances are wrong. Conflicts are won or lost at the strategic and operational levels; sometimes tactical battles influence this but not always the way people think. Unfortunately, I think we will still be talking of this war in another 1000 days.

A forced peace deal in Ukraine may have wider consequences

A forced peace deal in Ukraine may have wider consequences

A forced peace deal in Ukraine may have wider consequences

By Philip Ingram MBE

Reuters has reported that “Two key advisers to Donald Trump have presented him with a plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine that involves telling Ukraine it will only get more U.S. weapons if it enters peace talks. The United States would at the same time warn Moscow that any refusal to negotiate would result in increased U.S. support for Ukraine.”  The plan drawn up by Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, who both served as chiefs of staff in Trump’s National Security Council during his 2017-2021 presidency, would see a ceasefire based on prevailing battle lines during peace talks.  However, would this bring an end to the war and what are the implications?

Bloomberg reported that “before heading off to North Korea last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a “peace” offering to Ukraine. He pledged an immediate cease-fire and peace negotiations if Ukraine withdraws from four partially occupied regions and abandons its bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. His other stipulation, of course, is that the West lift sanctions.” Without seeing the detail, the Kellogg and Fleitz and Putin plans seem to be in the same ballpark, Ukraine ceding territory for a signed peace agreement.

The problem with international agreements is that Russia doesn’t have a good history keeping them and the West has an even worse history in enforcing them.

Matthew Bunn wrote in a paper for the Harvard Kennedy School titled, “Budapest Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future,” in March 2020. “On December 5, 1994, leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation met in Budapest, Hungary, to pledge security assurances to Ukraine in connection with its accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state. The signature of the so-called Budapest Memorandum concluded arduous negotiations that resulted in Ukraine’s agreement to relinquish the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, which the country inherited from the collapsed Soviet Union, and transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The signatories of the memorandum pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, and to refrain from the use or threat of military force.”

We then get into the Minsk agreements named after the capital of Belarus and were signed there in 2014 and 2015. They were an attempt to secure a ceasefire between the Ukrainian government and Russia-backed separatists in the east of Ukraine. They set out a roadmap for elections in the occupied regions on Luhansk and Donetsk and a plan to reintegrate the territory back into the rest of Ukraine.  However, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognised the independence of the self-proclaimed republics in the run up to his reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Putin does not have a good history in keeping to international agreements he has signed, and the West has an equally poor record in holding Russia to those agreements. It is those two points that would set any peace negotiation with Russia where Ukrainian territory was ceded to Russia that may, in the short term, temporarily end a very bloody conflict but would likely lead to a global conflict within a few short years.

What could the signing of a peace deal with Putin result in? The answer is really simple, the impact is potentially catastrophic. Initially it would probably bring an end to the bloodshed in Ukraine but both sides would feel unfulfilled. Rebuilding could start but the impact of what has happened would be felt for generations. The Zelensky government would fail, and any successor would have eyes on rebuilding Ukraine but the potential for corruption to come back and grow bigger would be huge given the effort Putin would put into influencing any new government and the money involved. The west would likely rein back and any Ukrainian accession plan to the EU or move towards joining NATO would be delayed and delays would keep creeping in.

Putin would keep his defence industrial base on its current footing but would be able to capitalise on the relationships he has been developing with Iran and China, alongside the lessons he will have learned from the battles in Ukraine, the Russians are very adaptable, and it is highly likely that they would capitalise on better Sino-Russian defence cooperation to capitalise on operational lessons learned, rebuild a more modern and capable Russian military whilst enhancing the Chinese PLA and increase influence, pushing to domination in the Middle East. The quid pro quo for China would be increased Russian support for Chinese dominance in SE Asia.

Tensions in the South China Seas have been growing for some time. In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favour of the Philippines and invalidated China’s claim in the strategic waters, Beijing refused to accept the ruling. Those disputed waters are in what China refers to as the nine-dash line, which overlaps the exclusive economic zones of rival claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

The nine-dash line, (also referred to as the eleven-dash line by Taiwan), is a set of line segments on various maps that accompanied competing claims of rights of control and include the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Scarborough Shoal. Certain places have undergone land reclamation by the PRC, ROC, and Vietnam.

With thanks to DW

This is in addition to the growing tensions between China and Taiwan.  Taiwan has been governed independently of China since 1949, but Beijing views the island as part of its territory as part of its one China Principal and recognition of this through a one China Policy has been the bedrock of Sino-US relations. However, Beijing has vowed to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the mainland, using force if necessary and tensions have increased dramatically as US and other global leaders increasingly talk of Taiwan outside Chinas language of it one China Principal.

Tensions are rising. The Democratic Progressive Party, whose platform favours independence, won a third consecutive term in 2024, while Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei.  Xi Jing Ping of China will be weighing up the potential impact of a reaction from the international community should he decide to take Taiwan by force. If he sees the West capitulate to Putin over Ukraine, he could easily decide that China, with its economic power, could ride out the impact of Western displeasure, especially if it saw an opportunity to further impact western economies and create opportunities for China, or a China, Russia or a China Russia Iranian Pact, possibly underpinned by the BRICS group of countries.

Bloomberg’s description of BRCS is, “The BRICS group of emerging-market nations — the acronym stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — has gone from a slogan dreamed up at an investment bank two decades ago to a real-world club that controls a multilateral lender. It doubled in size in 2024, pairing several major energy producers with some of the biggest consumers among developing countries and potentially enhancing the group’s economic clout in a US-dominated world.”

Of course, in the region we have tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It is widely reported and has been consistently reported for almost two years that rising tension on the Korean peninsula is eroding the safeguards set up by both countries against the risk of confrontation. There are regular incidents in the de-militarised zone and with North Korea’s sabre rattling. Increased cooperation with Russia will give the Kim Jong Un regime a boost economically and psychologically and will likely embolden Kim Jong Un which is never good for an unpredictable dictator with nuclear weapons. He could use any sign of weakness in the West as an opportunity.

SE Asian tensions don’t stop here. Russia and Japan have been at loggerheads since the end of the Second World War when the Soviet Union occupied four islands off the northeast coast of Hokkaido, Japan’s second-largest island, the Kuril Islands. Japan claimed that the Soviet Union incorporated them “without any legal grounds” and refused to sign a peace treaty. The Russians view the Kuril Islands as reward for the sacrifices of the Soviet people during the war.  Japan over recent years has changed its constitution from purely defensive to allow offensive operations to protect its territories and has been changing its military to include offensive capabilities.  Defences on the disputed Kuril Islands have been reduced to send military capability to Ukraine. Japan may decide the time has come to take them back.

Should tensions rise to conflict in SE Asia, that that conflict could easily be stimulated by the international community being seen to give in to Putin, then Putin would see any focus to that region by the international community as an opportunity to restart his ambitions to capture the whole of Ukraine and turn it into a Belarus like puppet state, as well as other surrounding states, no matter what peace deals had been signed. Of course, both China and Russia have their relationship with Iran to ensure Middle East tensions remain high. The potential for conflicts in the three separate regions is high and growing and the potential for them to join to a globally impactful conflict is growing also.

So, those who are calling for Ukraine to cede land to Putin in exchange for peace need to understand exactly what the implications are and how that could be a trigger for other conflicts to start.  To have any hope of deterring this we would need to be ready for a conflict on a scale that could be bigger than the Second World War and that means defence expenditure at levels countries haven’t begun to imagine yet.

Faragegate – the row over his comments

Faragegate – the row over his comments

Faragegate – the row over his comments

by Philip Ingram MBE

The row over Nigel Farage’s apparent suggestion that the West “provoked” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by expanding the European Union and NATO eastwards rumbled on. There is only one winner – Vladimir Putin.

Farage, the Reform UK leader told Nick Robinson of the BBC that “of course” the war was President Vladimir Putin’s fault. However, he added that the expansion of the EU and NATO gave him a “reason” to tell the Russian people “they’re coming for us again”.

This echoed a tweet Farage put out in Feb 2022 just after Russia reinvasion of Ukraine as they attempted to capture Kyiv, where he clearly stated, “a consequence of EU and NATO expansion.” Nick Robinson in the BBC Panorama interview challenged Farage over his judgement and past statements, including when he named Russian President Vladimir Putin as the world leader he most admired in 2014. Nigel Farage responded by saying, “I said I disliked him as a person, but admired him as a political operator because he’s managed to take control of running Russia.”

Nigel Farage’s position is not helped by his support for Donald Trump and Donald Trump’s less than supportive comments for Ukraine. To Putin, he sees an opportunity to attack support for Ukraine at its very core, through the UK General Election campaign and then into the US Presidential election campaign and he will be taking every opportunity to do so. His aim will be simply to create more division and uncertainty, to take the political focus away from Ukraine a little more.

So, what is the reality? Why did Putin decide to attack Ukraine in the end?

It is true that in 1990 President Bush had noted in a memo that he had said, “no extension for NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.”  This memo is often taken out of the geopolitical context. It was in relation to the immediate reunification of Germany and allaying concerns regarding the huge NATO forces that remained in Germany.

Those forces have subsequently been massively reduced. In addition, Russia has contributed to NATO led operations in the Balkans as part of the international force. First in Bosnia and then in 1999 in Kosovo.  This relationship was built on the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, signed in 1997.

Clear examples of cooperation as more members joined NATO were in 2006/2007 when the NATO-Russia Council at Military Representative level (MilReps of the 26 allies and RUS) met monthly to progress NATO/Russia military-to-military cooperation.  The Russian vessel, PITLIVIY joined Operation Active Endeavour in Sept 06, marked the first truly combined NATO-Russia force deployment. The operations were to deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. Several other exercises and cooperation’s with NATO took place including, Theatre Missile Defence exercises hosted by Russia, academic exchanges, search and rescue at sea training, communications exercises, military aviation exercises, fuels interoperability exercises. The Cold War had thawed and as the EU accepted more members and NATO did the same cooperation between Russia and NATO grew.

Then something changed, and that change was the era of Putin. Yes, Putin was concerned about NATO growing and the EU becoming an economic powerhouse to rival Russia but what concerned him more was Russia’s and his loss of status and influence. He vehemently disagreed with the break-up of the USSR, the Soviet Union and wanted it back; he recognised that Russia was losing its superpower status economically, politically and militarily.  However, he knows he could disrupt and influence political processes across the West and maintain a degree of control over what was most important to him, money, through disinformation, direct action, cyber activities and good old traditional ‘kompromat’ (gaining leverage over individuals and companies through use of compromising materials.)

Putin wasn’t bothered by other countries joining NATO or the EU provided he could maintain Russia’s (his own) influence. He would send warnings when he thought necessary, the 2007 Cyber-attack on Estonia, the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with Polonium 210 in London, the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018. These and many other incidents around the world, were designed to send messages to dissenters.

At the same time when he tested the West with operations like the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia the EU negotiated peace settlement favoured Russia. The Wests reaction to the July 2014 shooting down of the MH17 passenger airliner was extremely slow, and the Wests complete lack of action in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and creation of two artificial statelets in Ukraine, The Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples Republics, combined with his engrained belief that Ukraine didn’t deserve to be a separate nation is what kept his sights on Ukraine.

Budapest Memo, signed in 1994, where Russia, the US and the UK confirmed their recognition of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine making security commitments in return for soviet nuclear weapons being returned to the Kremlin, should have kept the peace. However, Putin already had Belarus as a Puppet state, Kazakhstan was under a degree of control as Russian Space launches from its territory kept the Rubles flowing and corruption across Ukraine allowed Russian oligarchs (and therefore Putin) to control access to the vast resources in what he saw as a substate of Russia.

However, the straw that ‘broke the camel’s back’ for Putin wasn’t NATO or the EUs expansion or possibility that Ukraine could join, as he knew the levels of corruption that he controlled would keep them from meeting even the basic criteria. After all to Putin, Ukraine was still and always would be “Little Russia.” This all changed when Zelensky won an election on an anti-corruption ticket against all odds. Putin’s business interests and ability to bring Ukraine under control politically as he had done with Belarus, were under threat. His ego, and fear at loss of business and influence started him on the path to wanting to topple Zelensky, by force if necessary.  All of this was on the back of the pro-freedom aspirations of the Maidan (Independence Square) protesters who rose against Kremlin-friendly president Viktor Yanukovych in late 2013 and early 2014. It stirred a terror in Putins heart in the wake of pro democracy protests in Russia 2010 – 2013 but sent the conditions for Zelensky and a desire to remove corruption from the heart of Ukrainian politics, that meant emasculating the oligarch criminal networks.

So how does all this come back to Farages interview on the BBC? Well simply he has given Putin the snippets necessary to produce the propaganda he can use to feed to his domestic audience and wider international BRICS partners. We can see how China is supporting Russia as is Iran and North Korea as are the the BRICS members. The author has edited the BBC interview to give you an example of that propaganda that will be made from Farages statement, this clip is likely to play across Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, North Korea, Iran, India and elsewhere saying even prime ministerial hopefuls in the British election blame NATO and the EU:

(video with thanks to BBC Panorama)

Trying to be clever and apply one dimensional and therefore flawed reasoning, as many commentators have also done, in what is a multi dimensional conflict, not being clear, and with the historical comments, Farage has given Putin a boost and he should have known that would happen! The cynic in me says in the run up to an election, no publicity is bad publicity – could that be his motivation?  Farage emphasised in his interview with the BBC that he thought Putins actions were wrong and that he did not support them.

Day 730 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day Special Military Operation

Day 730 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day Special Military Operation

Day 730 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day Special Military Operation

By Philip Ingram MBE

Day 730 of Vladimir Putin’s 10 Day special Military Operation, its second anniversary passes with little indication of how the conflict will end. The doom merchants are calling it a Ukrainian failure and anticipating a potential Trump Presidency bringing an end to the conflict by imposing a settlement, in order to “stop wasting US Taxpayers Dollars.”

From a one-dimensional perspective, where success is measured purely on the changes in the land based front line, Russia seems to have regained part of the initiative with the capture of Avdiivka, defended by Ukraine since 2014.  Russia has, with the help of North Korea and Iran, regenerated some fighting capability and is probing across various parts of the frontline; Ukraine seems unable to respond through lack of artillery and other ammunition as the Wests defence industrial base is found wanting and element of political “Ukraine fatigue” sets in.

However, this conflict is far from one dimensional in its nature. Measuring overall success by purely using land operations movement simply ignores the complexity of modern warfare and the situation on the ground. From a land perspective, every meter will continue to have to be hard fought over.  Casualties on both sides will remain huge, we forget this is the most bloody conflict we have seen since the second World War.

If we look at what has happened to date from strategic, operational and tactical perspectives:

Strategic Objective: Putin re-invaded Ukraine on 23rd February 2022 to try and topple the Zelensky government, put a puppet regime in place and reduce the potential for NATO expansion.

Outcome: The Ukrainians pushed Russia from Kyiv, forced their withdrawal to the eastern part of Ukraine, re captures thousands of square kilometres of land, destroyed thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and hundreds of thousands of Russian service personnel, stopped Russia gaining Air Superiority and sunk almost a third of the Black Sea Fleet. NATO has expanded welcoming Finland with a land border with Russia and will soon welcome Sweden. The Wests Defence industrial base has been shocked into expanding production capability to meet war needs. Russia’s defence industrial base is suffering such that supplies from North Korea and Iran are essential to the Russian war effort.

Result: Russia has refocused its main effort to the East and set new success criteria as holding onto the land it has captured to date by forcing Western ‘Ukraine fatigue.’ This is enhanced by Western focus shift to the Middle East.

Strategic Objective: Dislocation of Western and wider global support for Ukraine, collapse of NATO, further division within the EU and greater US isolationism.

Outcome: NATO has come together politically and militarily better than it has been before. It has recognised many of its shortfalls and in particular relationship with its defence industrial bases. Not only is it growing but it is slowly regenerating a better conventional capability. However, the EU is becoming increasingly politically polarised and elements of UK politics crave greater isolationism, and we are seeing a growth of right-wing politics. The UK has lost its influence and ability to bridge between EU and US politics. US support for Ukraine is being held up by the Speaker of the house alone as he focuses global issues for domestic purposes!

Result: Putin sees political weakness as the way of increasing ‘Ukraine Fatigue’ and gaining his objective of a settlement at current boundaries. He will increase destabilising activities across Europe, the UK and USA, in the run up to elections. He will pull every lever he can to cause controversy in the EU, UK and then US elections. He will continue to aid further destabilisation in the Middle East and Africa in order to create further political dilemmas and refocus attention away from Ukraine.  This will be Putin’s MAIN Effort through 2024.

Operational Objective: Putin’s Operational Objective is securing the territory he has gained, increasingly try and integrate captured regions including Crimea into Russia, influence Ukrainian exports through the Black Sea. He will try and do what he can to reinforce ‘Ukraine Fatigue’ as he sees this as his only path for a clear victory.

Outcome: Ukraine retains the operational initiative with Special Operations Executive (SOE) type operations happening across all of the occupied territories and into Russia itself. Trains are being derailed, factories catching fire, oil refineries being attacked by drones and of course huge success in sinking almost 1/3 of the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Result: Russia if having real difficulty defending against Ukrainian Operational level activities and until Ukrainian tactical supplies reach the levels needed to regain the tactical initiative, this is where the Ukrainian Armed Forces will continue to operate and have significant success, it will be Ukraine’s Main Effort through 2024. These operations are being headed by General Budanov who leads the GUR, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence. They are designed to and are having success in hollowing out Russia’s ability to sustain its tactical operations whilst influencing Russia strategic decision making.

Tactical Objectives: Russia is attacking across the whole front-line area and is having success at huge cost in manpower and equipment. Putin wants to capture as much of the Donbass as possible and right up to the Dnipro River if possible. He is heavily reliant on overmatching artillery fire supported by air and thousands of troops flooding the area. He remains reliant on North Korea and Iran to supply the necessary ammunition, as his defence industrial base is struggling. Ukraine remains reliant on Western Supplies but a lack of capacity in the Wests defence industrial base combined with political hiatus is impacting Ukraine’s ability to respond in any meaningful way.

 Outcome: Russia continues to make small gains but at huge cost. Ukraine continues to hold the Russians and heavily attrit their forces. However, neither side can yet generate sufficient combat power to create decisive conditions tactically.

Result: Once Western supplies started to be delivered at volume and Ukraine can regain some control of the airspace with F16s then the tide will turn, however this may not be until the summer at the earliest. Putin will recognise this and once his election if over in March, we may see political changes putting Russia on a greater total war footing.

Western Defence Industrial Base. What had been forgotten by the West is how important the ability for its defence industrial baes to expand ammunition production in time of war actually is. Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine has brought this to the fore but it will take 3-5 years and possibly longer to rebuild production capacity for ammunition, and equipment’s. This is being funded by the huge sums we hear being ‘donated’ to Ukraine. The reality is these huge sums are being spent in home countries like the USA, Germany, France, UK to increase the capacity of their defence industrial bases to manufacture and deliver ammunition to Ukraine but it has the added benefit of jobs and tax revenue in home countries and rebuilding a vital part of countries overall defence capability. Putin has forced and is helping the West prepare for the future.

The West is just beginning to realise the same with its armoured vehicles and aircraft but there seems to be little immediate impetus to restart tank and Infantry Fighting vehicle production lines in any meaningful way to increase over current capacity. As the Ukraine conflict continues, this will probably change.

I would see towards the second half of 2024 if the internal politics in the US can be sorted that resurgent Western supplies with allow Ukraine to regain a multidimensional initiative; but will it bring a quick end to the war? Highly unlikely, unless there is a major change in Moscow, we will be talking about the Russia Ukraine war in another 730 days I believe. However, in another 730 Days Russia will be significantly weakened, it simply can’t afford much more, whereas the West, affordability is merely a political decision as the price for Ukraine losing is significantly greater. It is that that will ensure continued Western support no matter what election outcomes unfold.

Ukraine, one year back and now

Ukraine, one year back and now

Ukraine, one year back and now

By Philip Ingram MBE

12 months ago, Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, was in the final stages of making his mind up about his planned re-invasion of Ukraine. His Navy was engaged in manoeuvres off the Southwest Coast of Ireland, sending a clear message to the EU and NATO that a neutral EU member left a proportion of the Atlantic approaches undefended and reliant on the Royal Navy and possibly French Navy to police the area. Putin was testing Western political messaging to see what any reaction might be if he attacked Ukraine.

What I had been noting in my blogs which started on 4th January 2022, discussing the Russian options around their large-scale deployments for manoeuvres close to Ukraine that “What is clear is that Putin is playing a game of 3D or 4D chess, every time he moves, he sits and watches what the global reaction is. He knows that he controls the timings to an extent. Troops deployed without purpose can become disillusioned, equipment deployed where it can’t be maintained properly becomes unreliable, funding large military deployments is expensive and the court of Russian public opinion, no matter how much it is controlled, will only stay silent for a finite period.”

In the information domain, Putin continues his tirade of commentary, much aimed at his domestic audience, trying to find excuses to justify why his Special Military Operation is going on a lot longer than he had hoped and why the number of Russian casualties is growing. On casualties, a rough number based on 100,000 dead Russians, fewer than Ukraine claims but about the same as many other analysts – in Warfare for every death there is 3-5 severely wounded – if we say 4 – that is 400,000 wounded – ½ a million in total – it is likely the Ukrainians have similar casualties, in almost 12 months we are possibly in the 1 million casualties’ bracket!

It must be recognised that Putin has lost every phase of his special military operation to date. Initially, his main effort was the rapid replacement of the Zelensky government through the capture of Kyiv, that failed and caused the collapse of all elements of his special military operation outside the initial successes he had in the East around the disputed Donbas Region. It was clear, although Ukraine had built strong defences, that they were forced to trade space in the East for time and that time was used to mobilise and deploy additional Ukrainian forces, stop and then defeat the Russian attack on Kyiv and then set the conditions for support from the international community.

The second phase was Russian withdrawal from Kyiv and the north-eastern Ukraine and the relaunch of a Russian main effort concentrating on the disputed Donbas Region. The decisive battle in this phase was the Russian battle to capture Mariupol and the eventual surrender of the Ukrainian Azov Battalion in the Azovstal Iron and Steel works in the city.

After that the momentum shifted, the Russians clearly having culminated again gave the Ukrainians an opportunity to wrestle the initiative back and dictate the operational tempo. The key element that enabled this was the deployment of the HIMARS and with that the Ukrainians managed to recapture two massive chunks of territory, initially around Kharkiv and then Kherson. They have now entered an operational pause whilst they continue to fix Russian forces in the Bakhmut area allowing time for more experienced soldiers and tank crews to go to the west to be trained on Challenger 2, Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, Bradley IFVs and more.  They not only need to learn how to operate the individual pieces of equipment but also how to fight them as part of an all arms battlegroup. This is no mean feat in a few short weeks.

Russia knows it must act decisively to regain the initiative and try and dislocate Ukrainian defences before these game changing new capabilities get deployed and will be planning a major offensive with what manoeuvre formations it can cobble together and regenerate.

There have already been reports of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division moving from its regeneration and training in Belarus round to the Lushank Oblast ready for operations. The new commanders of the Russian Campaign, General Gerasimov is taking a much more disciplined conventional military thinking approach, hence him starting to sideling the Wagner Private Military Company and more. Additionally, there are reports of 10’s of thousands of new Russian Troops in Melitpol waiting to be deployed.

However, it is unlikely that Gerasimov will have been able to fix some of the fundamental flaws in the Russian military, his logistics will likely remain uncoordinated, equipment unreliable, command and control hap-hazard at best with junior commanders lacking initiative, his logistics vulnerable and uncoordinated and I suspect he will be able to generate little more than a one shot wonder which is why simultaneously his forces have been preparing further defensive lines to try and slow any Ukrainian counter Offensive.

However, that one shot wonder could have a decisive breakthrough in their desire to secure the whole of the Donbas, but it is unlikely to have sufficient combat power to do so. We will then have the Ukrainians deploying their new manoeuvre capabilities, equipped with modern Western Tanks, IFVs and AFVs, able to fight 24 hrs a day. This is when any Russian gains will likely be very short term. Remember it is a sound and deliberate military operation to trade space for time and the Ukrainians are masters at it.

We are about to enter the decisive phase of this Russian Special Military Operation and the Russians love anniversaries so symbolically the Russian strike could come around 24th February with a secondary aim of wanting to broadcast success back to the Russian domestic audience. One thing is certain, we are in for a busy few weeks and months and the human cost is immeasurable.